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Abstract
This paper uses a reform-induced recoding of grades, which caused
variation in high school students’ grade point average (GPA), to iden-
tify students’ behavioral responses to changes in high-stakes grades.
The results show that students who were downgraded by the recoding
performed better on subsequent assessments and were more likely to
complete university programs after high school. As the recoding did
not convey information about actual academic performance, these re-
sults emphasize that changes in incentives are important in understand-
ing students’ responses to high-stakes grades. There is no evidence that
the recoding algorithm predicts outcomes for non-affected cohorts.
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1 Introduction
Standardized tests have become increasingly prevalent in school systems in many countries in
recent decades. These tests convey information that may affect students’ educational investment
decisions. Given that students have imperfect information on their ability and on how their effort
translates into performance, they may use test results to learn about their return to investments
in schooling (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012, 2014; Bandiera et al., 2015; Diamond and
Persson, 2016).
However, in addition to providing information on academic ability, test results and exam scores
often carry major consequences for students. These high-stakes exams may affect students’ like-
lihood of graduating high school or being admitted to a (selective) university. For example, exit
exams—which students have to pass to earn a high school diploma—have become common (Dee
and Jacob, 2011; Murnane, 2013). Moreover, university programs rely heavily on information
about educational achievement as a screening tool in the admission process. In the US, for in-
stance, many universities base their admission criteria on standardized tests such as SAT scores.
In other countries, such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, admission to post-secondary educa-
tion, especially to universities, is determined predominantly by high school Grade Point Average
(GPA). Still, much remains unknown about students’ behavioral responses to the actual changes in
incentives resulting from high-stakes exam scores.
This paper uses a novel identification strategy to isolate the behavioral effect of receiving lower
(higher) exam grades. We exploit a grading reform in Denmark that caused exogenous variation
in high school students’ GPAs (by recoding all their grades) to provide credible estimates of the
impact of high-stakes grades on subsequent educational investments. All students who were en-
rolled in their first year of high school during the implementation had their first-year exam grades
recoded to the new scale based on a scheme provided by the Ministry of Education. As they feed
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into the calculation of the final GPA, these first-year grades were high stakes.1 The consequence
of the reform was that two students with identical GPAs before the grading reform could have very
different GPAs after the reform. We exploit this reform-induced change in grades to identify the
students’ responses to a change in their GPAs. While the reform changed students’ grades, it did
not provide any new information about academic performance or ability to the students. Thus, any
changes in effort investment in response to the grading reform must reflect the grades per se and
the change in incentives.
The identifying assumption is that there are no systematic differences between students who
were adjusted upwards and downwards due to the grading reform that would affect future out-
comes. Under this assumption the association between the reform-induced change in GPA and
subsequent outcomes has a causal interpretation. We assess and discuss the threats to the identifi-
cation and provide evidence of the validity of the design. Particularly, the shock in grades appears
not to be systematically related to observed outcome-relevant traits. Furthermore, falsification
tests produce no evidence of performance effects for placebo cohorts that were not affected by the
reform.
Using Danish administrative data on the full population of high school students that were af-
fected by the reform, we find that students who experienced a negative shock to their GPAs due
to the reform, received better subsequent grades. Students who were downgraded one standard
deviation scored 8% of a standard deviation higher in subsequent assessments. Although part of
this effect is explained by teachers compensating unlucky students by inflating their post-reform
grades, students who received a negative shock also received better subsequent grades in national
standardized exams that are externally evaluated. Furthermore, although the effect is modest in
1In Denmark, high school performance almost entirely determines admission to post-secondary schooling and to
various academic programs, particularly at universities. Furthermore, access to university majors is based on high
school performance, and many selective programs (e.g., psychology or medicine) require high overall average scores
for admission. Nevertheless, a small share of post-secondary institutions determine their enrollment exclusively based
on entry exams or on a combination of high school GPA cutoffs and entry exams. These deviations are typically
observed for institutions that offer training in performing arts (e.g., music or acting). Moreover, educational programs
can decide to enroll a share of the students based on a combination of their GPA and other qualifications (e.g., work
experience). In 2008, 10 percent of enrollments were based on this scheme. Thus, high school grades are particularly
important.
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magnitude, we find that downgrading made students work less for pay alongside their studies. The
decrease in labor supply may suggest that students reacted to the negative shock by reducing time
spent on activities other than studying. The GPA shock also had long-run consequences: Students
who were downgraded by one standard deviation had a 2 percentage point higher probability of
enrolling in and graduating from a university program after high school. We find some evidence of
gender and ability differences in how students reacted to the GPA shock, but no clear differences
by socio-economic background.
Our study contributes to an emerging literature on test takers’ behavioral responses to feed-
back on educational performance. This literature examines how receiving a certain grade affects
student behavior and long-term outcomes. First, some studies examine the role of performance
information in students’ educational choices and find that the acquisition of new information about
academic ability affects beliefs about own ability, study effort, drop-out decisions, and college en-
rollment (Jacob and Wilder, 2011; Zafar, 2011; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012).2 Second,
studies have examined how external factors affecting high-stakes outcomes may have long-run im-
plications for individual human capital accumulation. Apperson et al. (2016), Dee et al. (2016)
and Diamond and Persson (2016) study how teacher manipulation of test results affects individ-
ual human capital accumulation. In related work, Ebenstein et al. (2016) study how variation in
exam scores due to pollution exposure affects post-secondary educational attainment and earnings.
These studies offer mixed conclusions. Whereas Ebenstein et al. (2016) and Diamond and Persson
(2016) find that those who receive a positive shock have better long-run outcomes3, Dee et al.
(2016) show that manipulation in scores have mixed impacts, and Apperson et al. (2016) find that
test score manipulation can even have a negative impact.
Overall the findings of this study contribute to this literature by showing that scores that carry
2Our work is also related to the literature on how performance labels that do not carry official consequences for stu-
dents affect their choices of post-secondary education (Papay et al., 2016; Avery et al., 2017; Smith et al., 2017).This
literature finds that two students with almost identical raw scores make different educational choices because of discon-
tinuities in the labeling. In other words, the two students know that their academic performance was almost identical,
but they nevertheless react to the labels. Whereas Papay et al. (2016) and Smith et al. (2017) examine test labels that
do not have major consequences for students, our study focuses on students’ responses to high-stakes outcomes.
3In a study of Swedish lower-secondary students, Diamond and Persson (2016) finds effects only for high-ability
students, who do not have strong incentives to perform better.
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official consequences for students affect individuals’ behavior during the program, and that these
behavioral changes translate into educational outcomes that have long-term consequences. The
findings of this paper demonstrate that these incentives can have important implications for stu-
dents’ human capital accumulation. Specifically, as the reform changed students grades—but did
not provide any new information about academic performance or ability—the change in test grades
should not affect the students’ perceptions about their ability or self-confidence. Instead, any
changes in effort investment in response to the grading reform reflect the change in incentives,
not learning. Thus, the findings suggest an important mechanism through which exam scores that
carry official consequences for students affect their behavior: Students may increase their effort in
response to negative grades in order to make up for the shock.
Our findings are also relevant to policy as they are informative about how students respond to
exogenous performance shocks in a high-stakes environment. Although the Danish educational
system differs in some respects from educational systems in other European countries and the
United States, the combination of compulsory standardized testing and internal evaluations in
schools is very similar to the high school exam structure in many other countries. The impor-
tance of these high school assessments for entrance into post-secondary schooling in Denmark
also closely resembles the high stakes of high school exams in the United States and elsewhere.
Thus, the results from this paper appear relevant not only for the Danish setting but for educational
systems in many other countries as well.
One important implication of the incentive effect is that variation in grading standards across
schools or teachers can have implications for students’ future academic performance and long-
run human capital accumulation. Exposure to higher standards (i.e. lower grades conditional on
performance) will require the student to invest more effort to obtain a certain grade average. This
mechanism is in line with existing findings on implications of higher grading standards (Betts and
Grogger, 2003; Figlio and Lucas, 2004), which finds that children exposed to harsher teachers
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have better subsequent test results.4 These results may also have implications regarding to returns
to school quality. Given that grading tends to be harsher in more selective schools (as suggested
by Calsamiglia and Loviglio, 2017), the incentive effects may account for some of the returns to
school quality (in terms of future academic performance and future labor market outcomes).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical expec-
tations for behavioral responses to grades. Section 3 provides the institutional background about
the Danish educational system and describes the grading reform. Section 4 describes the adminis-
trative data. Section 5 discusses the identification strategy and the estimation. Section 6 presents
the results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Grades and student behavior: Learning and incentives
To motivate the empirical analysis, this section presents a model on how performance feedback
may influence student behavior and outcomes. The objective of the model is to highlight the
difference between a low-stakes setting where responses are driven by a learning effect, and a
high-stakes setting where responses are also driven by incentives.5 First, academic output affects
individuals directly, for example through intrinsic motivation, confidence, or status. We consider
the following production function for academic output:
O(a,s) = (a× s)θ (1)
4Betts and Grogger (2003) exploit variation in standards across high schools and find that students in schools
with harsher standards (i.e., lower grades conditional on performance) get better subsequent test scores. The effect
is found for the entire distribution, but is strongest for the high achieving students. They find no effect on continued
schooling except for a negative effect for black and Hispanic students. Figlio and Lucas (2004) exploit variation
grading standards across teachers using data on primary school children in Florida. They show that teachers with
harder grading standards are associated with better learning outcomes for their pupils.
5Closely related to our theoretical framework, Azmat et al. (2016) propose a model that distinguishes between two
theoretical mechanisms. In their model, students may respond to information because individuals have an imperfect
knowledge of their own ability or because they have inherently competitive preferences.
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were 0 < θ < 1, a is ability and s is study effort. Second, the individuals care about chances of
admission to college:
A(a,s,u) = 1− e−(a×s+u) (2)
where u is exogenous factors affecting the grade. The only choice variable for the student is effort,
which is chosen to maximize the following utility function:
U = ωOO(a,s)+ωAA(a,s,u)−C(s) (3)
whereC(s) = ηs is the cost of study effort.6 The weights, ωO and ωA, capture how the individuals
weight academic output and admission chances. If for example a student has no plans of continued
schooling, but gains confidence and satisfaction from learning (an intrinsic motivation), we have
the case that ωO > 0 and ωA = 0. On the other hand, we could imagine students who have no
intrinsic motivation to study but only care about admission to educational programs because they
provide better job chances, i.e., a case with ωO = 0 and ωA > 0.
We now use the model to characterize how students may respond to performance signals. Per-
formance signals may either be informative about the level of ability and the production function
of academic output or about the exogenous shocks.
The learning effect of grades
Let us first consider the case where grades work as signals of academic ability. To simplify, con-
sider the case ωA = 0. As grades are low stakes and have no consequences, they only affect in-
dividual behavior through the first term, i.e., intrinsic motivation and confidence. Consistent with
recent literature (Bandiera et al., 2015; Azmat et al., 2016), the model assumes that effort and abil-
ity are complements in producing academic output. However, students have imperfect information
6Study effort comprises psychic costs (e.g., stress), direct pecuniary costs (e.g., study material such as books), or
indirect pecuniary costs (e.g., foregone earnings on the labor market). To keep the model as simple as possible, we
assume constant study effort costs; this assumption is not important for the objective of our.
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about their ability (and the production function) and, therefore, about how their effort translates
into performance. As students perceive the grade as informational about ability, the complemen-
tarity between ability and effort implies that the students learn about how their effort translates into
grades, which affect their future choices of study effort. In this simple case, a positive performance
signal will make the students want to increase their study effort as they realize the higher payoff of
their effort.
The incentive effect of grades
Consider now the case where ωA > 0. In this setting—which reflects a context in which conse-
quences are attached to grades—the response to a performance signal is less clear. The comple-
mentarity between study effort and ability implies that the second derivative with respect to ability
is ambiguous for the second term:
∂ 2A
∂ s∂a
= (1− s×a)e−(s×a+u) ≶ 0 (4)
A positive performance signal means that students have to supply less effort to achieve a given
chance of admission (the income effect). However, due to the complementarity between effort and
ability, the marginal benefit of supplying more effort is also larger (the substitution effect). How
the individual responds to a performance signal is therefore ambiguous.
Our empirical strategy is to study an exogenous performance shock, u, that is known to be
unrelated to ability. In this case, the effort response is unambiguous, because the first term of
the utility function is unaffected, and the second derivative of the second term is unambiguously
negative:
∂ 2A
∂ s∂u
= −a× e−(s×a+u) < 0 (5)
Because of the income effect, students reduce their effort in response to a positive GPA signal. That
is, for a given level of ability, the individual will put in less effort because the chances of college
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admission, given effort and ability, have increased. The shock only contains information about
exogenous factors. It does not affect the true academic output, nor does it contain new information
about the return to effort, but it affects the chances of admission. This effect reflects the fact that
feedback on exam grades often carries important consequences for students. For example, exam
grades are important for high school students as they may determine whether a student graduates
high school with a diploma or gets into a university program. If, for example, the cutoff for college
admission is lowered, students respond by lowering their effort. Thus, one could speak of an
incentive effect.
In sum, there are conceivable arguments supporting the hypothesis that changes in grades may
affect subsequent student outcomes. These effects could be driven either by students leaning about
their return to effort investment, by changes in students’ incentives, or by both.In the next section,
we present the empirical setting that enables us to isolate the incentive effect from the learning
effect.
3 Background
3.1 Secondary schooling in Denmark
In Denmark, compulsory education begins in August of the calendar year the child turns six and
ends after ten years of schooling (i.e., grades zero through nine). Having completed basic school-
ing, students may continue to a three-year high school program (grades 10 through 12), enroll in
vocational training, or enter the labor market. Among the 65 thousand children who left compul-
sory schooling in 2005 (the cohort analyzed in this paper), 52 percent continued in high school and
25 percent in vocational training. High school offers different programs: the general upper sec-
ondary education program (called ”STX”), the higher commercial examination program (called
”HHX”), and the higher technical examination program (called ”HTX”).
Despite slightly different curricula, the main objective of all high school programs is to prepare
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students for higher education, and they all provide equal access to higher education.7 The high
school programs consist of a wide range of courses on three levels. Level A, the most advanced
course level, typically covers all three years. Level B typically covers two years of high school.
Level C is typically a one-year course. All students are required to take a number of mandatory
courses (e.g., A-level Danish) as well as a minimum number of A-level courses, and within each
program, the students may choose between different tracks (i.e., major area of study).8 Students
request a preferred track when they apply for high school but are allowed to change track within
the first six months of their first year. Apart from the mandatory courses and the track-specific
courses, students may choose a few optional courses in their second and third years.
The students receive grades in all three years of high school, and the overall composite GPA
score is the simple unweighted mean of two intermediate average scores. The first is a weighted
average of grades in annual national exams, administered by the Ministry of Education, with in-
dependent examiners (i.e., external to the school). The second intermediate score is a weighted
average of classroom grades, determined via an internal assessment by the students’ teacher. The
final overall GPA score is calculated as the simple unweighted average of the two intermediate
scores.
Post-secondary schooling is free, and students receive a monthly student grant to pay for living
expenses for up to six years of post-secondary schooling. Access to post-secondary schooling and
to various academic programs, especially at universities, is almost exclusively determined by the
high school GPA. After completing high school, all students who wish to enroll in post-secondary
schooling apply through a centralized system with a list of prioritized educational programs. The
7In addition to these three high school types, there are one- and two-year high school programs with specific
admission requirements (called ”HF”). Whereas students have to enroll in STX, HHX, and HTX no later than one
year after they finish compulsory schooling, there are no age requirements for HF students, who therefore tend to be
older than students in the other programs. In this study, we focus on the three-year programs (STX, HHX, and HTX)
because they are very similar in structure, length, and prerequisites, and the implementation of the grading reform was
different for the HF programs. The included programs cover about 90 percent of all high school students in Denmark
in 2008.
8As of 2017, the number of tracks (as well as their individual content) is decided centrally by the government. The
STX program, for example, has 18 different tracks (e.g., a math track that consists of A-level Math, A-level Physics,
and B-level Chemistry). However, at the time of the implementation of the grading reform, each school decided the
number and content of the tracks at their school, which resulted in some variation across schools.
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Table 1: Implementation of Grading Reform across High School Cohorts
Grading scale
Enrolled Graduated Year1 Year2 Year3
Aug 04 Jun 2007 13 13 13
Aug 05 Jun 2008 13 7 7
Aug 06 Jun 2009 7 7 7
Notes: 13 = “13 scale”; 7 = “7-point scale”
programs set the number of available slots, N, and the course requirements (for example, eco-
nomics at the University of Copenhagen requires A-level in mathematics and in Danish and B-
level in history and in English). All students who fulfill the course requirements for the prioritized
program are ranked according to their high school GPA, and the first N students are given an of-
fer.9 The high school GPA is thus particularly important for students that wish to continue in
post-secondary schooling. Moreover, as first-, second-, and third-year grades count in the final
overall GPA, stakes are high during all three years.
3.2 The Danish Grading Reform of 2007
Until April 2007 student performance in the Danish school system, from lower secondary school-
ing to post-secondary schooling, was evaluated on a scale from 0 to 13 (called the “13 scale”). In
November 2004 The Commission for Examining the Danish Grading Scale recommended the in-
troduction of a new 7-point grading scale from -3 to 12 (called the “7-point scale”). In early 2006
the Government decided to introduce the new grading system, and in 2007 the 7-point grading
scale replaced the 13 scale grading system.
Table 1 shows how the reform affected students enrolled in a high school program during the
implementation. Students who enrolled in August 2004 and graduated in 2007 were unaffected by
the reform as they had all their assessment assessed on the old scale. In contrast, the cohort that
enrolled in 2006 only received grades on the new scale. For students who enrolled in August 2005
and graduated in 2008, coursework that was completed in the school year 2005/06 was assessed
9For details about the university admission process in Denmark, see Humlum et al. (2014).
11
Aug 05 Jun 06 Aug 06 Jun 07 Aug 07 Jun 08
Enrolls in
high school
Choose
Track
Reform
Announced
1st year
exams
2nd year
exams
3rd year
exams
Graduation
1st year grades
recoded
Treatment Outcome
Figure 1: Timeline: Assessment and recoding of grades for students who enrolled in high school
in 2005 and graduated in 2008.
on the 13 scale, and coursework completed in the school years 2006/07 and 2007/08 was graded
on the new scale. For this cohort, the grades obtained in their first year in accordance with the old
scale were subsequently converted to grades in the new scale based on a scheme provided by the
Ministry of Education.
Figure 1 shows the timeline for the 2008 graduating cohort that was affected by the recoding
of grades. After the students finished their first year of high school in the summer of 2006, all
their first-year grades were converted from the old to the new scale. Thus, their final overall high
school GPA was calculated based entirely on grades on the 7-point scale—and only the post-
transformation grades were shown on the high school diploma (Appendix Figure A.2 shows a high
school diploma for a student from the treated cohort).
Table 2 presents the transformation scheme provided by the Ministry of Education. The first
two columns describe the mapping scheme from the 13 scale to the 7-point scale. There are two
important sources of noise in the mapping process. First, because the new grading scale has fewer
grades (seven compared to ten), pairs of grades on the old scheme were collapsed to a single new
grade. Consider for example a student who only had 8s on the old scheme and another student
who only had 9s. Although the latter had higher grades prior to the reform, the two students would
have identical grades (i.e., 7s) after the recoding to the new scheme.
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Table 2: The Danish Grading System: Transformation from the Old to New Scale
Old New
ECTS Description
13 scale 7-point scale
00 -3 F
For a performance which is unacceptable in all respects.
03
0 F+
For a performance which does not meet the minimum re-
quirements for acceptance.5
6 2 E
For a performance meeting only the minimum require-
ments for acceptance.
7 4 D
For a fair performance displaying some command of the
relevant material but also some major weaknesses.
8
7 C For a good performance displaying good command of the
relevant material but also some weaknesses.9
10 10 B
For a very good performance displaying a high level of
command of most aspects of the relevant material, with
only minor weaknesses.
11
13
12 A
For an excellent performance displaying a high level of
command of all aspects of the relevant material, with no
or only a few minor weaknesses.
Source: The Danish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Higher Education.
Notes: ECTS is the grading system defined by the European Commission. 6 (old) / 2 (new) is the passing threshold.
Second, the distance between the old and the new grades varies along the scale. For example, a
5 on the old scale is ”punished” heavily as it is transformed to a 0 (i.e., the difference is five points),
whereas a 10 on the old scale is not punished (i.e., the difference is zero points). (Appendix Figure
A.4 plots grades on the new scale against the grades on the old scale.) Thus, two students with
identical pre-transformation GPAs could have very different post-transformation GPAs because
grades were punished differently.
As a result, depending on the composition of grades, the students were either down- or up-
graded relative to their peers. For example, a student with grades 5, 5, 6, 11, and 13 on the old
scale would have their GPA transformed from 8.0 to 5.2, while a student with grades 3, 5, 10, 11,
13
and 11 would have their GPA transformed from 8.0 to 6.8.10 The number of grades given in the
first year of high school depends on the specific high-school track chosen by the student. Students
typically receive three to five grades in the first year (pre-transformation) and around 30 grades in
years two and three (as shown in Appendix Figure A.5). While more grades imply that more grade
combinations can cause a specific pre-transformation GPA, the link between number of grades
given on the old scheme and the potential variation in post-transformation GPA is not trivial (as
Appendix Figures A.3a and A.3b show). For some pre-transformation GPAs a lower number of
grades given is associated with a greater potential post-transformation difference in GPA.
4 Data
For the analyses we use administrative data provided by Statistics Denmark that include all stu-
dents who graduated from a three-year high school program in 2008. As the registers contain
information only on individuals who completed high school, we do not observe grades for students
who dropped out of high school.11 Furthermore, we exclude 950 students who were not graded
on both grading scales, as they are unaffected by the change of grading system. The high school
data contain information on courses and exam-specific grades. The high school data are merged
with administrative data from Statistics Denmark on child background (gender, age, and origin)
and with school records on middle school GPA (i.e., the exit exams at the end of ninth grade). The
final sample consists of 26,760 students.12 For each student we record parental characteristics the
year before the student enters high school using the income and education registries from Statis-
10While the collapsing of grades and the varying distance to the new grades caused noise in the individual students’
GPAs, the grading reform also affected the overall level and distribution of grades. Figure A.6 in the Appendix shows
the high school GPA distribution for the cohorts graduating in the years 2003 to 2013. After the reform, the density in
the center of the distribution is lower and the tails are fatter. The level shift should not affect students’ incentives, as
the GPA cutoff levels were adjusted mechanically.
11As we discuss in Section 6, the pattern in drop-outs appears to be unrelated to the grading reform.
12We exclude 695 observations due to missing middle school GPA and 3 observations due to incomplete high school
records. The most likely reason for a missing middle school GPA is that the students completed lower-secondary
schooling outside Denmark. No further data restrictions are imposed. The final sample includes 94 percent of the
initial population. Including students with missing observations yields qualitatively identical results. These results are
available upon request.
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tics Denmark. We construct a variable for the average parental net income and a variable for the
average years of parental schooling.
We also link each student to the education registries to measure their post-secondary schooling
outcomes and to records on their labor market attachment during high school. We measure the
labor supply during high school for the calendar year 2007, which corresponds to the second half
of the second year in high school and the first half of the third year in high school.
Table 3: Variable descriptives
Mean SD
Age at HS enrollment 16.66 0.67
Female 0.56 0.50
Non-western origin 0.05 0.21
9th grade GPA 0.27 0.85
Parents’ years of schooling 14.63 2.01
Parents’ income (1,000 Euro) 35.80 24.55
Worked in second year 0.86 0.35
Labour income in second year, (2015 1,000 Euro) 5.75 3.88
Grades recoded 3.41 2.71
Grades given after recoding 29.03 3.24
Notes: Parental characteristics are measured in the calendar year prior to stu-
dent’s high school enrollment. All monetary values are converted to the 2015
price level using the consumer price index.
Summary statistics for key variables are provided in Table 3. There are more girls than boys in
the sample. The students are on average 16.7 years old at enrollment and five percent are of non-
western origin. In line with expectations, there is evidence of positive selection into high school.
High school students have a middle school GPA that is on average 0.3 standard deviations above
the mean for their 9th grade cohort. 86 percent of the students worked during high school for an
average of nearly 6,000 Euros in gross labor earnings.
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5 Identification & estimation
5.1 Empirical strategy
The grading reform constitutes a policy change that allows us to examine whether an observed
exogenous change in high-stakes GPA affects students’ performance. To illustrate the change
caused by the reform, Figure 2 shows a heat-map of students’ GPA before and after the recoding of
their first-year grades.13 As Figure 2 illustrates, there is substantial variation in post-transformation
GPA for any given level of pre-transformation GPA. For example, if we compare two students with
a pre-transformation GPA of 8, one could end up with a post-transformation GPA of about 7,
whereas the other could end up with a post-transformation GPA of about 5. The dashed line shows
the quadratic fit, which captures the relationship fairly well. To assess the impact of the recoding
of grades on subsequent performance, we estimate the following equation with OLS:
Yi = β0 +β1GPA7i+ f (GPA13i)+λ′sη+δ
′Xi+ εi (6)
where Yi is the grade point average of grades given in years two and three (i.e., after the grade
transformation), GPA7i is grade point average of first-year grades after the recoding to the 7-
point scale, GPA13i is the grade point average of original first-year grades on the 13-scale before
the recoding 14, λ is a vector of school fixed effects, and X is a vector of individual specific
covariates including gender, origin (western or non-western), indicators for being first or second
generation immigrant, age, middle school GPA, average parental income, average parental years of
schooling, and indicators for whether parents are observed in the data. We include these covariates
to obtain more precise estimates of the impact of the grade shock, as they are highly predictive of
13Due to confidentially issues, we cannot show cells with fewer than three observations. However, the regressions
analyses are based on all observations.
14We standardize Yi, GPA7i, and GPA13i to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In our main analysis,
we present results using a second order polynomial for the functional form, f (), but, as we show, the conclusions are
not sensitive to the choice of functional form.
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Figure 2: Actual pre- and post-transformation GPA of first-year grades.
Notes: Only combinations with at least three observations are shown.
the students’ subsequent performance and educational outcomes. The standard errors are clustered
at the school level.
5.2 Strategic responses to the implementation of the grading scheme in Dan-
ish high schools?
The key aim of this paper is to study how the change in grades induced by the transformation
of first-year grades affects subsequent behavior. The causal interpretation of the GPA shock is
based on the assumption that the shock is unrelated to student characteristics that are related to
the outcome of interest. There are, however, theoretically reasonable ways in which students (and
their teachers) could respond to the introduction of the grading reform that would complicate the
identification of the effects of the shock in grades.
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As the government announced the introduction of the new grading scheme in early 2006, one
concern would be that high school students responded to this information by changing their choice
of tracks in ways that were more advantageous. As the number and composition of grades given in
the first year of high school depends on the specific high school track chosen, risk-averse students
might have tried to avoid the transformation noise by selecting course tracks that reduced the
number of grades that were transformed. Importantly, this would only constitute a problem for
identification if groups of students systematically selected tracks to avoid courses for which they
had private information on the risk of receiving a grade that was penalized heavily.
Both institutional knowledge and empirical evidence suggests that such strategic behavior was
limited. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the Google search term popularity for the new scale for the
period 2005 to 2009. The search term ”7-trins skala” (English: ”7-point scale”) gained popularity
after July 1, 2006 and maintained a relatively constant level over the remaining period. Although
we cannot rule out that students knew about the new scale before the first-year exams (i.e., before
July 1, 2006), this Google search trend at least suggests that the new grading scale was discussed
primarily after its implementation. Importantly, even for well-informed students, challenges and
barriers are present. As tracks are selected within the first six months of the first year of high
school, this choice is made before the students know about their final first-year grades. Thus,
students cannot change track after their pre-transformation grades are disclosed.
Apart from the track-specific courses, students can choose a few courses in their second and
third years. Students could, therefore, respond to the grade shock by taking more (or less) ad-
vanced courses. To assess whether students change their course choices in response to the grade
shock, Table 4 presents results from models, where we regress the number of advanced courses on
the grade shock. The students end up with on average five A-level courses (Danish and History are
mandatory A-levels for all high school types). There is no evidence that the grade shock is related
to the level of the courses that the students choose (i.e., the number of A and B-level courses).
Nor is there any evidence that students were less likely to take A-level mathematics as a result
of a negative grade shock. That the grade shock did not affect whether the students take A-level
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mathematics—which is typically perceived to be one of the most challenging courses—provides
suggestive evidence that students did not take less challenging courses because of a negative per-
formance shock. Thus, statistical evidence also speaks to the concern that students did change
courses in response to the reform.
Table 4: Regression results, course selection.
B-levels A-levels A-level math
(1) (2) (3)
Recoded GPA -0.009 0.000 0.006
(0.019) (0.011) (0.015)
Mean of dep. var 3.49 4.99 0.41
Observations 26,759 26,759 26,759
Clusters 209 209 209
R2 0.30 0.37 0.18
Notes: The table shows point estimates and standard errors for β1 in equation (6),
estimated with ordinary least squares. The dependent variable is denoted in the
column header. The grade point averages are standardized to have a mean of zero
and a unit standard deviation. We control for first-year GPA before recoding us-
ing a second order polynomial. The covariates included are age at high school
entry, gender, 9th grade GPA (standardized) origin (indicator for non-western ori-
gin), parental education (years of completed education included, average across
parents), income (disposable income, average across parents), the number of non-
missing parental education and income observations (indicators). All parental vari-
ables are measured in the calendar year before the focal individual enrolled in high
school. 9th GPA indicates that the sample is split by the median of the students’
middle school GPA. Parents with high education are parents with an average length
of education (years of schooling) above the median (observations with no informa-
tion on parental years of schooling are not included). Standard errors clustered on
the school level in parentheses.
Dropping out of high school—or switching to another school—is another potential response
to the grade shock. As our data only contains information on individuals who completed high
school, the design would not provide valid causal inferences if such dropout patterns are related
to student outcomes. To assess this threat, we describe the dropout patterns across cohorts in
Appendix Figure A.8. The figure shows that the number of students who dropped out increased
considerably for the cohort that enrolled in 2005. Importantly, however, the graph also shows that
the increase in dropouts happened during the first year (i.e., before the grade shock occurred) and
that there were no changes in dropout levels in year 2 and 3. The change in dropout patterns—with
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more students dropping out during their first year—is likely due to the rather comprehensive high
school reform that was implemented in 2005. For example, before this reform, the STX program
consisted of two tracks: a “math/science track” and a “language track” that students applied to
prior to enrollment. In 2005 a number of tracks replaced the two-track system and students had to
pick their track within six months of enrollment. In sum, as the dropouts mainly increased before
the first-year grades were revealed for students and grades were transformed—and because the
increase is a level shift rather than a spike—it appears unrelated to the grading reform.
Moreover, if selected groups of students dropped out because of a specific grade shock, we
would expect the grade shock to be related to student-specific characteristics. Thus, to further
assess the identifying assumption, we study whether the GPA change is related to covariates that
are highly predictive of student achievement. We estimate a series of regressions where we use
each of the covariates as the dependent variable. Each entry in the Table 5 represents an estimate
from a regression of the GPA shock on a demographic characteristic. All point-estimates are small
and statistically insignificant. The absence of signs that the change in GPA caused by the recoding
process is related to observable characteristics strengthens the conclusion that the reform did not
lead certain groups of students to drop out and affirms the validity of the design.
Table 5: Regression results: Balance of covariates across treatment.
Yˆ 9. GPA Female Parental Parental
education income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Recoded GPA -0.004 0.001 -0.016 -0.064 -0.908
(0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.048) (0.573)
Mean of dep. var 0.03 0.27 0.56 14.63 35.80
Observations 25,011 26,759 26,759 25,042 26,658
Clusters 209 209 209 209 209
R2 0.40 0.39 0.07 0.15 0.05
Notes: The table shows point estimates and standard errors for β1 in equation (6), estimated without
covariates using ordinary least squares. The top row indicates the dependent variables. Yˆ is the
predicted value from regressing the GPA given after recoding on all covariates included (see notes
for Table 3). Standard errors clustered on the school level in parentheses.
Another concern would be that teachers adjusted their grading behavior prior to the reform.
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The internal grading procedure for the classroom grades leaves scope for teachers to manipulate
the pre-transformation grades. For example, to help students, teachers could avoid the grades in
the first-year exam that were penalized the most in the transformation scheme. Figure A.7(a) in the
appendix compares the distribution of first-year grades in the affected cohort with the distribution
of grades in the earlier cohorts that were not affected by the grading reform. One complication
of this analysis is that the high school reform in 2005 affected the curriculum of the high school
tracks and the composition of first-year coursework. Given that the grading pattern varies across
subjects15, some changes in the grade distribution are expected as a result of the high school
reform.16
Although there are some changes in the grade distribution in 2005, we find no evidence that
teachers tried to help students by avoiding the first-year grades that were penalized the most. If the
grading reform led teachers to avoid these grades, we would expect fewer 5s, 7s, and 9s and more
6s, 8s, and 10s. However, the treated cohort has more 5s, 6s, and 7s, but fewer 9s and 10s.17
Although we cannot rule out that other types of teacher adjustments took place, the lack of
evidence that teachers inflated less penalized grades is reassuring. Moreover, this would only
constitute a challenge to the identification if teachers’ propensity to manipulate a student’s grade
was associated with other student-specific characteristics (e.g., student ability or behavior). As
previously shown, the change in GPA caused by the recoding process was not related to observable
characteristics, which suggests that the reform did not lead teachers to manipulate certain of their
students’ scores.
15For example, grades in math are usually lower than in other subjects
16As the high school reform was implemented nationwide—and all students in our data are affected by the reform—
it should not affect our main analysis.
17Another way teachers could adjust their grading would be to set the first-year grades by already taking into account
the subsequent re-calculation of the grades. To study if this is the case, A.7(b) plots the distribution of grades across
cohorts where we re-calculate first-year grades for pre-reform cohorts (i.e., the three cohorts prior to the one affected
by the reform) as if the grading reform had been implemented. As A.7(b) shows, the changes in grading pattern that
happened in 2005 were rather modest relative to the changes that occurred after the implementation of the reform.
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6 Results
6.1 Effect of shock in first-year grades on subsequent student performance
in high school
We begin by investigating the effect of the reform-induced change in grades on student perfor-
mance in the second and third year of high school. Table 6 shows the results from estimating the
effect of a change in first-year GPA on subsequent grades. The dependent variable is the average of
the student’s grades in second and third year of high school. Column (1) shows the main effect for
the full sample. Students who are downgraded due to the recoding of the first-year grades perform
better in the second and third year of high school relative to their peers. The coefficient is precisely
estimated and shows that high school students who are downgraded by one standard deviation on
first-year GPA perform 8 percent of a standard deviation better in subsequent grades.18
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 6 show results from subsample regressions where the sample is
split according to the median middle school GPA. While we find a small and imprecisely estimated
negative effect for the subsample of students with a middle school GPA below the median, we find
a larger and statistically significant effect for students with a middle school GPA above the median.
The fact that students with an above-median middle school GPA perform better if they receive a
negative shock may suggest that high-performing students care particularly about their high school
grades. Most admission cutoffs for universities are in the upper part of the high school GPA
distribution. Thus, although low-performing students have an incentive to ensure that they end up
with a GPA above the proficiency threshold, high achievers may be more responsive to a change
in their GPA. The results presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 6 show that while the effect
of a negative shock is positive for both boys and girls, it is strongest for female students. Finally,
18Table A.1 reports the estimates of GPA13 and GPA132. As expected, there is a strong positive association between
first-year grades (i.e.,GPA13) and second- and third-years grades. Although part of this relationship may be due
to the learning effect, a major concern is that the students that receive good grades in first year are likely to be
different on unobserved characteristics from the students who do not, and that these differences may be correlated with
performance—a bias that is likely to persist even after we condition on the detailed data from the Danish registers.
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columns (6) and (7) show that there is no clear difference in response by parental background.19
To give a sense a of magnitudes. We find that a one standard deviation decrease in grades
caused a performance improvement of about eight percent of a standard deviation in subsequent
grades. Given that on average three out of 30 grades were recoded (see Table 3), the point estimates
should be adjusted by a factor ten, as a rule-of-thumb. In other words, a student who has two grades
recoded, and two grades given after the recoding, would be able to compensate for about 80 percent
of the shock. Some subgroups were, however, able to fully compensate for the negative shock (i.e.
girls: 10×0.106=1.06).
Table 6: The effect of a GPA shock on subsequent grades. Dependent variable: Grades given after
transformation (standardized).
9th GPA Gender Parental edu.
Main Low High Boys Girls Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Recoded GPA -0.079 -0.031 -0.096 -0.041 -0.106 -0.062 -0.091
(0.017) (0.025) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022)
Mean of dep. var -0.00 -0.54 0.53 -0.09 0.07 -0.16 0.18
P-value 0.03 0.04 0.32
Observations 26,759 13,218 13,538 11,677 15,080 11,414 13,628
Clusters 209 208 207 207 208 209 208
R2 0.60 0.39 0.51 0.59 0.62 0.57 0.61
Notes: The table shows point estimates and standard errors for β1 in equation (6), estimated with ordinary least
squares. The grade point averages are standardized to have a mean of zero and a unit standard deviation. We control
for first-year GPA before recoding using a second order polynomial. The covariates included are age at high school
entry, gender, 9th grade GPA (standardized) origin (indicator for non-western origin), parental education (years of
completed education included, average across parents), income (disposable income, average across parents), the num-
ber of non-missing parental education and income observations (indicators). All parental variables are measured in
the calendar year before the focal individual enrolled in high school. 9th GPA indicates that the sample is split by
the median of the students’ middle school GPA. Parents with high education are parents with an average length of
education (years of schooling) above the median (observations with no information on parental years of schooling are
not included). ”P-value” provides p-values for the null-hypotheses that the point-estimates are the same for the two
respective subsamples. Standard errors clustered on the school level in parentheses.
In our main analysis, we impose a linear functional form on the relationship between the
reform-induced GPA shock and subsequent grade. To test whether the effects are non-linear (e.g.,
asymmetric for positive and negative shocks), we examine this relationship in a non-restrictive and
19Results for low (and high) income parents are very similar to the results for parental education. Results are
available upon request.
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visual manner. Figure 3 shows the parametric specification (equation 6) as a solid line and plots
a histogram that shows the distribution of the grade shock. The gradient of the line resembles the
negative coefficient from Table 6. The dashed line in Figure 3 shows a non-parametric specification
of the relationship between the change in grades and subsequent performance. While the relation-
ship is relatively flat at the lower and upper ends, the linear specification fits the nonparametric
pattern fairly well for the range of the GPA shock covering most observations.
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Figure 3: The relationship between the reform-induced GPA shock and subsequent grades.
Notes: The plot shows the relationship between the residuals from regressing respectively the recoded GPA and the
GPA for subsequent grades on the all covariates, a second order polynomial in first year grades before recoding and
school indicators. The dashed relationship is estimated using the epanechnikov kernel, with the a bandwidth based
on the rule-of-thumb bandwidth estimator. The solid line is linear fit using ordinarily least squares. The dotted lines
indicate the 95 percent confidence interval. The gray bars show the fraction of the observations (in percent). The figure
excludes bottom and top 1 percent of the residuals from the recoded GPA.
To assess the sensitivity of the results presented in Table 6, we conducted a series of robustness
checks. Table 7 presents results for a variety of specifications. Column (1) shows the results from
estimating a model without covariates. The point estimate is close to the main result that includes
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the full set of covariates. In our main analyses we condition on a second order polynomial of the
pre-transformation GPA. In columns (2) and (3) we show results from estimating the model in
equation (6) using a linear and cubic polynomial for the functional form f (). As the table shows,
the results are not sensitive to the the choice of functional form.
Furthermore, in the main analyses the model estimates the impact of the change in GPA com-
pared to the cohort GPA change. However, if students do not have access to the nationwide distri-
bution of grades, they may instead compare their GPA change to that of peers at their school. In
column (4) we show results from estimating a specification where the pre-recoding GPA is inter-
acted with school indicators. The coefficient is, again, very similar to the main results. Finally, in
column (5) we first residualize the recoded GPA (as in Figure 3) and then exclude the individuals in
the bottom and top percentile of the residualized GPA. In other words, we exclude the individuals
who experienced the largest changes due to the recoding. The coefficient is very close to the main
specification.
Table 7: Regression results, alternative specifications. Dependent variable: Grades given after
transformation (standardized).
Without Linear Cubic School No
covariates specific Outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Recoded GPA -0.090 -0.091 -0.082 -0.078 -0.087
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Mean of dep. var -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Observations 26,759 26,759 26,759 26,759 26,299
Clusters 209 209 209 209 209
R2 0.44 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.59
Notes: The table shows point estimates and standard errors for β1 in equation (6), estimated with ordinary least
squares. See notes for Table 6. Column (1) shows results from estimating a specification without covariates and school
fixed effects. Columns (2) and (3) show results from estimating a specifications with respectively linear and cubic
polynomials in pre-recoded GPA. Column (4) shows results from estimating a specification where the polynomials
in pre-recoded GPA are interacted with school indicators. Column (5) shows results from a specification where we
exclude outliers in terms of treatment.
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6.2 Do teachers manipulate scores in response to the grading reform?
Even if a positive effect of a downward GPA shock on subsequent student achievement can be
established, it is important to understand the factors driving the improvement in performance. One
plausible mechanism would be that teachers systematically manipulate student scores in response
to the reform. Earlier literature has focused on how the incentive structures associated with test-
based accountability may cause teachers to intentionally manipulate standardized test scores (e.g.,
Jacob and Levitt, 2003; Neal, 2013). Lavy (2009) finds, on the other hand, that although a teacher
incentive program in Israel increased teacher effort, it did not affect test score inflation. The Danish
grading reform did not provide pecuniary rewards to inflate grades for specific students. However,
Dee et al. (2016) suggest that even in the absence of incentives, altruism among teachers may be a
strong motivation to manipulate scores. In a study of New York City schools, they also find that a
teacher’s propensity to manipulate a student’s exam is influenced by the student’s prior test scores.
If the teachers know the outcome of the recoding for individual students, they could be more
generous to ”unlucky” students. If teachers compensate students who are penalized by the grading
reform, the performance effects reported in the main results section could reflect teacher manipu-
lation rather than true gains in student performance.
To assess this explanation we exploit the variation in how grades are set. As described earlier,
each student receives both exam grades and teacher evaluations based on classroom performance.
Whereas the student’s own teacher has full discretion regarding the classroom assessment, the
written exams are graded by two external examiners. These examiners are teachers from other
schools without any knowledge about the students.20
Table 8 shows the results from using internal grades only (i.e., teacher evaluations in the sec-
ond and third year, as well as exams that were partially graded by an internal examiner) and using
external grades only (i.e., written exam grades in the second and third year). As Panel A shows,
the results for internal grades are positive and precisely estimated. Although smaller in magni-
20Whereas examiners are appointed by the Ministry of Education for STX exams, HHX and HTX schools appoint
the external examiners themselves.
26
Table 8: Regression results, internal vs. external assessments.
9th GPA Gender Parental edu.
Main Low High Boys Girls Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Dependent variable: internally graded grades
Recoded GPA -0.083 -0.032 -0.102 -0.047 -0.108 -0.062 -0.098
(0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.027) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022)
Mean of dep. var 0.00 -0.52 0.51 -0.11 0.08 -0.16 0.18
P-value (sub groups) 0.02 0.06 0.25
B. Dependent variable: externally graded grades
Recoded GPA -0.043 -0.012 -0.049 0.005 -0.081 -0.043 -0.045
(0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Mean of dep. var -0.00 -0.51 0.49 -0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.17
P-value (sub groups) 0.24 0.02 0.95
P-value (int vs. ext) 0.02 0.33 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.39 0.01
Notes: The table shows point estimates and standard errors for β1 in equation (6), estimated with ordinary least squares.
”P-value (int vs. ext)” provides the p-value for a test of equal coefficients on external and internal assessments. See
notes for Table 6.
tude, Panel B shows that there are also effects when we use the average of the externally given
grades as outcome. However, the difference in the main effects based on the internal and external
assessment is significant; a pattern consistent with teachers manipulating scores for students that
were unlucky. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that overall improvements in grades also reflects
genuine performance improvement.
6.3 Does student labor supply respond to the shock in grades?
Having established that the reaction in terms of subsequent grades reflects improved performance,
we now examine whether this is achieved by adjusting effort. Students who increase study effort
may have to reduce the time spent on other activities. We assess this in terms of student labor
supply during high school. We measure the labor supply for the calendar year 2007, which corre-
sponds to the second half of the second high school year and the first half of the last high school
year.
Panel A of Table 9 shows the results from using an indicator for whether the individual worked
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for income as the dependent variable. Around 86 percent of the high school cohort worked during
high school. There is no evidence of an effect of the GPA shock on this extensive margin of
labor supply. However, Panel B of Table 9 shows that students reacted on the intensive margin.
Using gross labor income measured in 1,000 euro (2015 level) as the dependent variable, we find
that students who received a positive GPA shock increased labor income by, on average, 66 euro
(corresponding to an increase of 1.1 percent, evaluated at the sample mean). That is, students who
were downgraded due to the reform reduced the time spent on other activities.21
Although the subsample analysis in Panel B shows that the coefficients for all subgroups are
positive, the labor supply response appears to vary somewhat in magnitude across subgroups.
There is a relatively large labor supply response among students with parents with an average
length of education below the median, which is in line with the main results that showed that this
group also experienced a performance improvement in response to a negative shock. However,
there is also some evidence of a larger labor supply response for students with a below-median
middle school GPA than for students with an above-median GPA. Although the difference is not
statistically significant at the 5 percent level, this pattern is in contrast to the performance response,
suggesting that the relationship between educational improvements and time spent on work along-
side studying is complex and affected by demographic characteristics. Finally, we do not find that
girls and boys differ in their response in terms of their labor supply.
6.4 Effects of a GPA shock on the likelihood of post-secondary schooling
As students reacted to a reform-induced change in their first-year GPAs in terms of subsequent
grades, the GPA shock could have long-run effects on human capital accumulation. Table 10
shows the effect of the GPA shock on enrolling in and completing a university degree within six
21An alternative conceivable mechanism would be that students who were downgraded responded by improving
their educational achievement, which allowed them to work on the side. Moreover, student could potentially shift to
better paying jobs in response to the grade shock. Nevertheless, the fact that we only find an effect on the intensive
margin (and not the extensive margin) supports the notion that labor supply works as a mediator.
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Table 9: Regression results: labor supply mechanisms.
9th GPA Gender Parental edu.
Main Low High Boys Girls Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Dependent variable: labor income > 0
Recoded GPA 0.002 0.009 -0.003 0.009 -0.001 0.006 -0.004
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
Mean of dep. var 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.82 0.89 0.88 0.84
P-value 0.46 0.50 0.56
B. Dependent variable: labor income (1,000 euro)
Recoded GPA 0.251 0.409 0.083 0.234 0.236 0.406 0.072
(0.087) (0.132) (0.119) (0.153) (0.108) (0.129) (0.122)
Mean of dep. var 5.75 6.23 5.29 5.85 5.68 6.23 5.30
P-value 0.07 0.99 0.06
Notes: The table shows point estimates and standard errors for β1 in equation (6), estimated with ordinary least
squares. See notes for Table 6.
years of finishing high school.22
Panel A of Table 10 provides suggestive evidence of an enrollment effect. A one standard
deviation decrease in the recoded GPA causes a two percentage point increase in the likelihood of
enrolling in a university program. The effects are largest for girls and for individuals with a high
GPA in middle school. This is in line with the main effect. Students respond to a negative shock
by improving their effort and consequently are more likely to enrol in university.
Panel B shows that these effects also translate into graduation. The effects are even stronger
(both larger and more precise). A one standard deviation decrease in the recoded GPA causes a
two percentage point increase in the likelihood of graduating from a university within six years of
finishing high school. Evaluated at the sample mean of 51 percent this corresponds to an increase
of about four percent.
For the overall average relationship, there is no mechanical effect in the sense that the improved
performance caused a higher GPA that gives access to more programs, because the student response
22We use educational status in 2014, six years after graduation, as this is the last year we observe the educational
status.
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Table 10: Regression results, long-run effects. Dependent variable: Completed university degree
within six years of finishing high school.
9th GPA Gender Parental edu.
Main Low High Boys Girls Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Dependent variable: Enrolled in a university program within three years after HS
Recoded GPA -0.017 0.011 -0.027 0.009 -0.036 0.007 -0.037
(0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013)
Mean of dep. var 0.39 0.24 0.54 0.39 0.39 0.30 0.47
P-value 0.11 0.04 0.04
B. Dependent variable: Graduated a university program within six years after HS
Recoded GPA -0.023 0.004 -0.038 -0.004 -0.040 0.000 -0.042
(0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013)
Mean of dep. var 0.51 0.35 0.66 0.52 0.50 0.41 0.60
P-value 0.05 0.10 0.05
Notes: Notes: The table shows point estimates and standard errors for β1 in equation (6), estimated with ordinary least
squares. See notes for Table 6. Higher educational covers 3-4 year programs like teachers college and nursing school.
Adv. higher education are typically university programs.
is insufficient to fully compensate for the negative shock. One explanation for this long-run effect
could thus be that an increased study effort in response to a GPA change increases the students’ ex-
posure to academic material and therefore their aspirations for further education. A long-run effect
on university graduation of about four percent, which is driven by behavioral changes, seems sub-
stantial. However, for some sub groups (i.e. for girls), the response was sufficient to compensate
for the negative shock, which also explains why the long-run university enrollment and graduation
effects are strongest for these groups.
6.5 Falsification tests
The causal interpretation of the GPA shock is based on the assumption that the shock is unre-
lated to observed and unobserved characteristics that are related to the outcome of interest. As we
showed earlier , the change in GPA caused by the recoding process is not related to observable
characteristics. While this test is informative on whether the reform-induced GPA change is re-
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lated to observable characteristics, it cannot inform us on how the shock is related to unobservable
characteristics. To assess this concern, we run a set of placebo regressions, in which we implement
the grading reform on non-reform cohorts and conduct the same analysis as for the main analysis.
Specifically, we implement the grading reform on the cohorts of high school students who gradu-
ated in 2005, 2006, and 2007 and were graded according to the old scheme (i.e., the three cohorts
prior to one affected by the reform). We impose the recoding on the first-year grades and proceed
as described for the main analysis. As the covariates are not available for all placebo cohorts, these
coefficients are all estimated without covariates (but with school fixed effects).
If the grading shock is unrelated to the outcomes students would exhibit without the shock, one
should not expect to see any effect for cohorts unaffected by the reform. Figure 4 shows the results
across outcomes. Compared to the estimates from main analysis, the estimates of the placebo GPA
change are small. Moreover, only 1 out of 21 estimates is statistically different from zero at a 5
percent significance level. Given the large number of tests (and a 95 percent significance level
that suggests that in expectation 1 out of 20 independent tests would turn out significant even if
there is no effect) one significant estimate is not surprising. This analysis provides strong evidence
that the combination of grades that leads to a downgrade or an upgrade is not related to subsequent
performance. These results are reassuring in terms of the causal interpretation of the post-treatment
differences in outcomes for the cohort that was affected by the reform.
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Figure 4: Placebo tests. Estimates by high school cohort. 2005-2007 are untreated cohorts and
2008 is the treated cohort. As our data do not include covariates for the 2005-2007 cohorts, all
specifications are estimated without covariates, but with school fixed effects.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we present evidence that Danish high school students reacted to a change in their
high-stakes GPA that was caused by the implementation of a new grading system. We find that
a downgrade of the first-year GPA causes them to do better in their second and third years. The
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effects are larger for girls and for students with a middle school GPA above the median. To address
the concern that the effect could be driven merely by teachers manipulating internally assessed
grades, we also study standardized national exams that are externally graded and find that the
effects persist. The behavioral response to the negative GPA shock is sufficiently large to have
long-run implications: Students who received a negative GPA shock to their first-year grades were
ultimately more likely to complete a university degree within six years of high school graduation.
We also show that students who received a negative GPA shock reduced their labor supply while
in high school, which may indicate that one channel through which the effect of the grade shock
worked was that students increased their study effort and reduced time spent on other activities.
The findings indicate that students adjust labor supply, subsequent school performance, and
college enrollment in reaction to a change in their GPA that is unrelated to their prior performance.
The results appear relevant not only for the Danish setting but for educational systems in other
countries as well. Although the Danish educational system differs in some respects from educa-
tional systems, the importance of exam grades resembles the high stakes of high school exams in
other European countries and the United States. The findings may therefore be informative about
how students respond to observed external shocks in outcomes of high-stakes assessments (e.g.,
computer breakdowns during exams or other exam conditions).
More generally, whereas previous literature has focused mainly on the signaling value of
grades, our results suggest that the high stakes related to assessments are consequential for stu-
dent behavior within the educational system. A deeper understanding of how high-stakes feedback
on educational achievement affects student behavior remains an important goal for future research.
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Appendices
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Figure A.1: Google Search Trend 2005-2009. The popularity is measured relative to the most
popular search time/term for the period, which is set to 100.
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Figure A.2: High School Diploma for the treated cohort (graduates from 2008)
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Figure A.3: Combinations and maximum difference, given GPA and number of transformed
grades.
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Figure A.4: Mapping from 13 scale (old grading scale) to 7-point scale (new grading scale).
39
0
10
20
30
Sh
ar
e 
(pe
rce
nt)
0 20 40 60
Number of grades given
Pre transformation Post transformation
Figure A.5: The number of grades given before and after the transformation.
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Figure A.7: Grading patterns of 1st year grades by high school cohort
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Figure A.8: High school enrollment and dropouts by year of enrollment, divided into groups
according to the high school year they dropped out of high school.
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Table A.1: The effect of a GPA shock on subsequent grades: Dependent variable: Grades given
after transformation (standardized), with coefficients for original GPA.
9th GPA Gender Parental edu.
Main Low High Boys Girls Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Recoded GPA -0.079 -0.031 -0.096 -0.041 -0.106 -0.062 -0.091
(0.017) (0.025) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022)
Original GPA 0.483 0.458 0.508 0.470 0.489 0.494 0.470
(0.019) (0.027) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023)
Original GPA squared 0.052 0.070 0.014 0.059 0.046 0.068 0.040
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Mean of dep. var -0.00 -0.54 0.53 -0.09 0.07 -0.16 0.18
P-value 0.03 0.04 0.32
Observations 26,759 13,218 13,538 11,677 15,080 11,414 13,628
Clusters 209 208 207 207 208 209 208
R2 0.60 0.39 0.51 0.59 0.62 0.57 0.61
Notes: The table shows point estimates and standard errors for β1 in equation (6), estimated with ordinary least
squares. The grade point averages are standardized to have a mean of zero and a unit standard deviation. We control
for first-year GPA before recoding using a second order polynomial. The covariates included are age at high school
entry, gender, 9th grade GPA (standardized) origin (indicator for non-western origin), parental education (years of
completed education included, average across parents), income (disposable income, average across parents), the num-
ber of non-missing parental education and income observations (indicators). All parental variables are measured in
the calendar year before the focal individual enrolled in high school. 9th GPA indicates that the sample is split by
the median of the students’ middle school GPA. Parents with high education are parents with an average length of
education (years of schooling) above the median (observations with no information on parental years of schooling are
not included). ”P-value” provides p-values for the null-hypotheses that the point-estimates are the same for the two
respective subsamples. Standard errors clustered on the school level in parentheses.
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